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George J. Borjas and Richard B. Freeman 
After decades during which the influx of immigrants to the United States de- 
clined relative to the growth of the native work force, immigration has once 
more become a major factor in the U.S. labor market.  Since the  1930s, the 
immigrant flow has risen by about one million immigrants per decade. By the 
1980s, about 600,000 persons were legally admitted to the United States per 
year, which added approximately 400,000 workers to the labor force annually. 
In addition, a steady flow of illegal entrants produced over three million un- 
documented aliens who qualified for amnesty under the provisions of  the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act. Even though only 5 percent of the U. S. 
population was foreign born in 1970, by 1988 over 9 percent of the labor force 
was foreign born. As a result of these trends and the concurrent slowdown in 
the growth of the native work force, immigrants accounted for more than one- 
quarter of new labor market entrants between 1980 and 1988. Key provisions 
of  the  1990 Immigration Act and the continued influx of illegal immigrants, 
together with slower growth of the female work force and other demographic 
changes, ensure that the representation of immigrants in the U.S. labor force 
will increase through the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Who are the immigrants? How do they perform in the U.S. labor market? 
How  do they  affect the employment opportunities  of  natives? How  do the 
labor market effects of immigration compare to those of international trade? 
What does immigration to the United States do to the economies of the send- 
ing countries or regions? 
These questions, which are central to any assessment of the economic effect 
of  immigration, guided  this  and  the  preceding  NBER  research  project  on 
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immigration. The first research report (Abowd and Freeman  1991) analyzed 
the effect of the post-1965 wave of immigration on the U.S. labor market and, 
for comparative purposes, studied immigration in two other major immigrant 
host countries,  Canada and Australia.  The current study provides  additional 
analyses of the economic effects of immigration on the United States through 
the late 1980s and explores the links between immigration to the United States 
and selected source area economies. Both research projects concentrated on 
the  “new  immigration”  that  followed  the  1965  immigration  act,  which 
scrapped the national origins quota system and thus greatly altered the number 
and characteristics of immigrants. 
1. The New Immigration 
Prior to 1965, immigration to the United States was guided by the national 
origins quota system. Under this system, which dated from the 1920s, almost 
all available visas were given to applicants from northern and western Euro- 
pean  countries.  The 1965 Amendments  to the immigration  and Nationality 
Act  removed  the  national  origin  quotas  and  made  family  reunification  the 
main objective of immigration policy. As a consequence of the 1965 Amend- 
ments and of major changes in economic and political  conditions in source 
countries relative to conditions in the United States, the national origin mix of 
the immigrant flow entering the United States has changed substantially over 
the past few decades. 
Table 1 lists the “top ten” source countries during the 1950s and during the 
1980s. There is a substantial amount of turnover in this list: only three coun- 
Table 1  “Top Ten” Source Countries in the  1950s and 1980s 
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tries that were important sources of immigration during the 1950s remained 
so during the  1980s (Mexico, Cuba, and the United Kingdom).  During the 
1950s, 53 percent of  immigrants originated in Europe,  25  percent  in Latin 
America (i.e., the Western Hemisphere except for Canada), and only 6 per- 
cent in Asia. In contrast, during the  1980s, only  11 percent  of immigrants 
originated in Europe, whereas 42 percent came from Latin America and 42 
percent from Asia. While lifting restrictions on immigration from countries in 
Asia allowed the migration of Asians to occur, and the cutback in the number 
of visas for western European countries reduced the potential size of the im- 
migrant flow from those countries, U.S.  immigration policy  is not the sole 
cause of  changes in  the national  origin mix of  immigrants.  Availability  of 
visas aside, potential migrants come to the United States on the basis of the 
benefits and costs of such a major decision in their lives. Economic and polit- 
ical conditions  in the source countries and  in the United  States (as well  as 
opportunities available in other immigrant-receiving countries) are potentially 
important determinants of these decisions and thus of the national origin mix 
of the immigrant flow. 
In addition to the legal immigrants, a sizable flow of illegal aliens entered 
the United States in the  1970s and 1980s, primarily from Mexico. As noted 
above, in  1986 Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA),  which gave amnesty to over three million  illegal  aliens, indicating 
that at least that many had entered illegally, mostly since the mid-1970s. Al- 
though IRCA included employer sanctions designed to deter the future entry 
of illegal immigrants, the flow of illegals did not appear to have slowed sub- 
stantially  by the end of the  1980s. In  1989, for example, the Border Patrol 
apprehended 954,000 persons attempting to enter the United States illegally, 
about the same number as it apprehended in 1982. 
The 1990 Immigration Act introduced several provisions designed to alter 
the size and composition of  the immigrant flow. By 1995, the number of legal 
immigrants admitted annually (excluding refugees)  will increase from about 
500,000 to 675,000. While the bulk of these visas (480,000) will be awarded 
to relatives of persons already residing in the United  States, the number of 
visas awarded  to persons  on the basis  of  skills will increase greatly:  from 
54,000 to 140,000. In effect, about half the additional visas will be awarded 
to skilled workers. Finally, to generate a more ethnically diverse foreign-born 
population,  the remaining 55,000 visas will be allocated to persons originat- 
ing in countries that have sent few immigrants to the United States since 1965. 
This provision is designed primarily to benefit visa applicants from European 
and African countries. 
Immigration reduces the size and alters the skill endowments of  the labor 
force available to the source countries, with positive or negative consequences 
depending on the state of their labor markets. In some cases, immigration to 
the United States has greatly depleted the population of small source areas in 
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and one-third  of  Puerto Ricans, who have citizenship  in the United  States, 
have chosen to emigrate). Even  among larger countries, immigration to the 
United States can have a nonnegligible effect on the size and composition of 
the labor force, particularly  among selected skill groups. In the  1980s, 1.4 
percent of Mexicans (most of them unskilled) migrated legally, and perhaps 
as many illegally,  to the United  States.’ While relatively  few Indians have 
come to the  United  States, virtually  all  Indian  migrants  have been college 
graduates, many of them doctors. For a complete analysis of the economics 
of immigration, it is necessary to consider the effects of  immigration not only 
on the economy of the United States but also on the economies of  the source 
areas. This volume seeks to do this for selected areas where the effect of im- 
migration is likely to be large. 
2. The NBER Project 
Motivated by the changing national origin composition  of  the immigrant 
flow admitted to the United States and by the fact that immigration affects the 
economic well-being of workers in source countries as well as in the United 
States, the NBER undertook the research project whose results are presented 
in this volume. 
Concern with both sides of the immigration “trade” led project researchers 
to develop data on the labor force and economies of the source countries or 
areas and also to analyze data from the U.S. Census of Population, which has 
long been the mainstay of  information on immigrants to this country, and from 
various Current Population Surveys that include questions on immigration. In 
some cases, this involved adding variables about aggregate economic or dem- 
ographic conditions  in  source countries  to the Census files. In one case, it 
involved  linking  Census and labor force  survey files from the  source area, 
Puerto Rico, which has a similar statistical base as the United States proper, 
to the relevant U.S. data sets. In another case, the analyst exploited available 
surveys on the labor force in El Salvador and conducted field and survey re- 
search in the country. The use of computerized data sets on immigrants in the 
United States and on persons in the source countries is rare in the analysis of 
immigration, as  any  survey of  the  voluminous  U.S.  research  makes clear. 
Such data sets allowed this NBER project to derive firmer conclusions about 
the characteristics and economic effects of immigrant flows than could possi- 
bly be reached  from data sets covering only the United States or any single 
source country. 
Finally,  to deal  with  issues  of  assimilation  of  immigrants  from different 
countries to the United States, researchers combined data from decennial Cen- 
suses to create “synthetic cohorts”-persons  in a given age group in one Cen- 
1.  In the 1980 Census, counted and uncounted illegal immigrants from Mexico exceeded the 
number of legal immigrants (see Borjas, Freeman, and Lang 1991). 5  Introduction and Summary 
sus and those in that age group plus ten in the succeeding Census. In investi- 
gations  of  how  immigrants  progress  in  the  economy  relative  to  natives, 
synthetic cohorts offer a research tool that is superior to the more commonly 
used cross-sectional comparisons between immigrants who came in one pe- 
riod and those who came years earlier or later. 
The NBER  research  project paid  considerable  attention to migration  be- 
tween Puerto Rico and the mainland even though (or perhaps more properly 
because) Puerto Rico is not a foreign country but rather an integral part of the 
United  States. Migration from Puerto Rico, which  has a different language 
and culture than the mainland, is free from political  impediments and thus 
provides a natural experiment to assess individual decisions to migrate, absent 
the  need  for  entry  or exit  visas.  If  economic  analysis  cannot  account  for 
Puerto Rican  migration  decisions, its relevance  to immigration  from other 
areas, where the immigration decision is distorted by both U.S.  immigration 
policy and source-country emigration policy, is subject to question. 
The analysis of the economic effects of immigration on source economies 
focused on potentially instructive “natural experiments” where the outflows to 
the United  States were large: Puerto Rico, which has a larger proportion of 
persons born outside the United States residing in the country than any other 
locale; and El Salvador, a small country whose migrant flows are sufficiently 
sizable to have potentially large economic effects. The initial research design 
envisioned  that the political problems in El Salvador-repression  and civil 
war-might  give an “exogenous” shock to immigration that could help iden- 
tify its effects on the economy and that the resultant immigration would differ 
greatly from immigration from Puerto Rico. In fact, one of the major results 
of the analysis is that, despite some differences in the pattern of immigration 
from these areas, economic incentives rather than exogenous political factors 
appear to dominate migrant flows from both areas. 
In capsule form, the research in this volume adds to our stock of knowledge 
about immigration in several areas. It shows that labor market opportunities 
in source areas relative to opportunities in the United States help determine 
the magnitude  and composition  of immigrant  flows (Borjas; Ramos; Funk- 
houser; Castillo-Freeman  and Freeman).  It also shows that the changing na- 
tional origin mix of immigrants over time-that  is, the greater influx of per- 
sons from less-developed countries  with lower education and income levels 
than the traditional European  source countries-is  the prime determinant of 
the decline in the skills of immigrants relative to native workers in the United 
States (Borjas). 
The research on assimilation shows that immigrants assimilate fairly rap- 
idly in the U.S. job market, with the result that, a few years after arrival in the 
United States, immigrants earn roughly as much as comparably skilled native- 
born workers of the same national origin, but not necessarily as much as the 
typical native worker (LaLonde and Topel). This finding reinforces the impor- 
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contribution to the nation’s skill endowment. The research on fertility behav- 
ior yields an even more striking example of “assimilation”; it finds that immi- 
grant women from high-fertility countries have essentially the same fertility 
behavior as native American women (Blau). The low fertility of  these immi- 
grants prior to immigration  suggests a strong element of  selectivity  or pre- 
adaption to the expected U.S. economic conditions. 
With respect to the economic effects of immigration on source economies, 
immigration to the United States is a major element in the economic develop- 
ment of these areas (Funkhouser; Castillo-Freeman and Freeman) and thus a 
potentially important policy tool to spur development. In addition to the direct 
effects of immigration on the size and composition of the labor force, remit- 
tances from immigrants  in the United States to the source countries induce 
changes in the labor supply behavior of remaining family members. 
On the U.S. side, the increasing number of immigrants with less than a high 
school education appears to have substantially affected the job market for the 
declining number of natives in that schooling category (Borjas, Freeman, and 
Katz). This finding suggests that the effect of immigration on the earnings and 
employment  opportunities  of native-born workers is much greater than was 
reported in the first NBER volume (Abowd and Freeman 1991),  which based 
its assessment on the relatively small differences in the economic position of 
natives across localities with differing immigrant flows. One possible reason 
for the difference in results is that natives adjust their migration  behavior to 
the influx of  immigrants, with the result that total labor supplies in immigrant- 
intensive areas are little affected by immigration (Filer). 
All told, this volume shows that immigration links the labor markets of the 
United States and of  major source areas in important ways, ways that affect 
the well-being of workers in both the destination and the source economies. 
Thus, the economic development and human capital formation policies of the 
major source countries should be matters of concern to Americans as well as 
to citizens  of  those  countries  sending  large numbers  of  immigrants  to the 
United States. 
We summarize next the specific findings that underlie these broad conclu- 
sions and the evidence and logic on which they are based. Some of the find- 
ings are new because  previous research either did not  address the  issue or 
addressed it with less-adequate data than were available to this research proj- 
ect. Some of the findings disagree sharply with earlier work. When that is the 
case, we note the disagreement, try to pinpoint  the causes of  the disagree- 
ment, and consider which results appear to be more valid. 
Source Countries and Immigrants to the United States 
1. The changing national origin mix of  immigrantjows is the major reason 
for the decline in the skills of  immigrants relative to natives. 
At the time of entry into the United States, the typical worker who migrated 
in the late 1950s had about 0.4 years more schooling than natives. By the late 7  Introduction and Summary 
1970s, the typical newly  arrived immigrant  had  0.7 years  fewer schooling 
than natives (Borjas, table  1.4). In  terms of earnings,  the late-1950s immi- 
grant earned  13 percent less than natives at the time of arrival, while the late 
1970s newly arrived immigrant earned nearly 30 percent less than natives. 
A single factor, the changing national origin mix of the immigrant flow, is 
responsible for most of this decline in relative immigrant skills (Borjas). This 
conclusion is based on two facts. First, the skills and labor market perform- 
ance of  immigrants  vary  significantly  by  national origin. For instance,  the 
1980 Census reveals that newly arrived immigrants originating in the United 
Kingdom have 2.5 years more schooling and earn about 22 percent more than 
natives, while newly arrived immigrants from Mexico have 6.1 fewer years of 
schooling and earn about 61 percent less than natives (Borjas, table 1.8). Sec- 
ond, the national origin composition of immigrant flows has shifted from the 
more-developed to the less-developed countries (see table 1 above). 
Given large and reasonably constant differences in the education and U.S. 
labor market performance  of immigrants from different countries, the contri- 
bution of the changing national origin mix to the decline in relative immigrant 
skills can be obtained simply by applying different distributions of immigrants 
by country to any particular year’s difference between the education and earn- 
ings  of  natives  and immigrants  by  country. The result  of  such calculations 
clearly shows the massive effect of the actual change in the source country 
mix on the average labor skills of immigrants. 
2. Migration from source areas to the United States is consistent with an 
economic analysis of immigration based on labor supply considerations. 
As noted above, migration from Puerto Rico to the United States presents a 
natural  experiment  for  testing  economic  theories  of  immigration  because 
Puerto Ricans face no quotas or legal impediments to moving to the mainland. 
Ramos applies the self-selection model of immigration introduced by Borjas 
(1987b) to the Puerto Rican case and finds striking confirmation of the mod- 
el’s stress on the effect of differing rates of return to skills between source and 
destination areas on the skill composition of migration flows. 
According  to the model, highly skilled persons migrate to countries that 
offer a relatively high rate of return to their skills, while the less skilled prefer 
countries with more egalitarian income distributions. Since Puerto Rico’s in- 
come distribution offers a much higher payoff to skills than does that of the 
mainland United States, the analysis implies that highly skilled Puerto Ricans 
will, on average, prefer to remain in Puerto Rico and that the less skilled will 
migrate to the United States. Ramos makes use of information on the educa- 
tion and earnings of migrants to the United States and of residents in Puerto 
Rico, distinguishes between those who never migrated and return migrants, 
and finds that migrants to the United States are less skilled than nonmigrants 
and that return migrants tend to be the most-skilled workers from the initially 
unskilled flow. 
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man explore the potential effects of one policy innovation-enactment  of high 
minimum wages-on  immigration  to the United States. They show that the 
introduction  of  a  U. S.  -level  minimum wage  reduced  employment  substan- 
tially on the island and that immigrants to the United States consisted dispro- 
portionately  of persons lacking work on the island and of those with charac- 
teristics that made them especially subject to the minimum. They found that 
the tendency for migrants to be less educated than nonmigrants developed in 
the 1970s as the Puerto Rican minimum rose toward U.  S. levels and as return 
to schooling rose on the island relative to the mainland. 
Funkhouser’s analysis of  migration from El Salvador lends additional sup- 
port to the notion that economic factors are critical in determining immigra- 
tion flows. While noting the difficulty of differentiating the effects of structural 
economic problems from civil war-related  political repression  on immigra- 
tion, he attributes much of the immigration flows to economic conditions per 
se. Here, however, it is the more educated who come to the United States-a 
fact that can be attributed to the massive difference in income levels between 
El Salvador and the United States and the information and transportation costs 
of  migration  for the less educated. Castillo-Freeman  and Freeman’s  finding 
that those at the very bottom of the educational attainment ladder in Puerto 
Rico are also unlikely to migrate in large part because they speak no English 
helps reconcile the Puerto Rican and Salvadoran cases. 
3. Immigration and  trade  alter  U.S.  factor proportions in the same direc- 
tion: increasing the supply of less-skilled labor. 
The classic Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade predicts that flows of  factors 
and goods will operate in the same direction to equate relative factor propor- 
tions across’economies.  The United States has an exceptionally large propor- 
tion of highly educated workers, suggesting that trade and immigration should 
act to increase the relative number of  less-skilled workers. Borjas, Freeman, 
and Katz show that this is in fact the case in their comparisons of the “implicit 
skill composition” of trade and the educational composition  of  immigrants. 
On the immigrant side, the greatest number of immigrants are persons with 
less than a high school degree. On the trade side, import-intensive industries 
tend to employ relatively low-skill workers, including many immigrants. 
Assimilation into the United States 
4.  Immigrant earnings  may reach parity  with those of  their native-born 
ethnic  counterparts,  but  not  with the  earnings  of  the  typical native-born 
worker. 
As new entrants to the U.S. labor market, immigrants invariably start their 
work lives in the United States at a disadvantage compared to otherwise simi- 
lar natives (i.e., natives with the same educational attainment, age, etc.). The 
speed with which immigrants assimilate to the labor market, measured by the 
rate at which their earnings catch up to the earnings of natives as they accu- 
mulate labor market experience in  the  United  States, has  long  been  a key 9  Introduction and Summary 
indicator of  the ability of the economy  to absorb immigrants and of  immi- 
grants’ ability to adapt to U.S.  economic conditions.  Because a single cross 
section cannot disentangle the economic effects of assimilation from those of 
changes in the unmeasured characteristics of cohorts who come to the country 
at different times (Borjas 1985), the importance of  assimilation can be deter- 
mined only by analyzing longitudinal data or “synthetic” cohort data created 
from a series of Census cross sections. 
LaLonde and Topel show that the  extent of  economic “assimilation” de- 
pends critically on the groups of native workers to which immigrants are com- 
pared. From 1970 to 1980, new immigrants did not catch up with typical U.S. 
workers in terms of earnings. By contrast, they did catch up with native-born 
workers from similar ethnic groups. In addition, the state of the labor market 
when immigrants arrive can also affect how well they do. Less-skilled  immi- 
grants are likely to do worse if they come to the United States when the job 
market for the less skilled is deteriorating, as in the 1980s, than if they come 
when that job market is improving; similarly, how well skilled immigrants are 
likely to do will depend in part on the market for skills when they enter the 
country. 
LaLonde and Topel’s evidence differs from Borjas’s (1985) decomposition 
of immigrant wage growth into cohort and assimilation effects. Borjas gener- 
ally finds a smaller rate of earnings adaptation within national origin groups. 
The related  questions of  how best to define economic assimilation and how 
best to measure it have attracted substantial attention. Recent work by Smith 
(1991) and Friedberg (1991) argues that the intercensal comparisons that are 
the basis of the findings both in Borjas and in LaLonde and Topel are subject 
to error because they fail to control for the age at which persons migrated. For 
any given time-of-arrival cohort, the composition of the working-aged sample 
will change across Censuses because later Censuses include a larger number 
of immigrants who migrated as children and who thus did not go through the 
same process of labor market adaptation as persons who migrated as adults. 
The evidence shows that rates of growth of earnings of immigrants differ de- 
pending on whether those immigrants came as children or as adults. Persons 
who came to the United States as children look similar to native-born workers. 
Persons who migrate as adults do not experience that much economic assimi- 
lation. Mixing the two groups overestimates the rate of growth of  immigrant 
earnings relative to native earnings. 
5.  The fertility rate  of  immigrant women is similar to the fertility rate  of 
native-born women. 
Earnings assimilation,  while important, is not the only way in which im- 
migrants adjust to the U.S. economic conditions. Blau compares the fertility 
of immigrant women in the United States to average rates of fertility in those 
women’s  source countries  and  to the fertility  of  similarly  aged native-born 
women. The initial expectation of the study was that immigrant fertility rates 
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indicating  partial  adjustment  of  fertility  over  time,  consistent  with  Ben- 
Porath’s (1973) findings for Israel. In fact, the results are much more striking. 
The average married immigrant woman had 2.4 children in  1980, compared 
to 2.2 children for similarly aged women born in the United States and to an 
average of 5.5 children  for a woman residing in the typical source country 
(Blau, tables 4.1 and 4.3). 
Even prior to migrating to the United States, the fertility behavior of immi- 
grant women tends to resemble that of  native-born  women, not that of their 
compatriots who remain in the source countries. After arriving in the United 
States, immigrant women make further adjustments to their fertility, so that 
after a few years in the United States the number of children borne by immi- 
grant women is quite similar to the number borne by native-born women. This 
remarkable similarity in fertility behavior raises important questions about the 
way in which the flow of immigrant women is self-selected  or adapts to ex- 
pected U.S. economic conditions even in their home country and about the 
extent to which immigrant women learn and adapt to the U.S. environment 
after arrival. 
Repercussions of Immigration for Source Countries 
6.  Immigration to the United States has major direct and indirect effects on 
the labor markets of  small source areas. 
The most immediate and direct effect of immigration to the United States 
on the labor market of a small source economy is through the reduction in the 
labor supply of migrants. However, there are also important indirect modes of 
adjustment  that can augment or offset the  direct reduction in  labor supply 
(Funkhous6r). Remittances from immigrants raise the income of family mem- 
bers remaining in the source country, with the standard income effect of reduc- 
ing the family’s labor supply. At the same time, the family may substitute for 
the migrant in the local labor market, which is particularly likely if  wages or 
other earnings opportunities rise owing to immigration or if  the reduction in 
family size “frees up” time previously devoted to household production. In El 
Salvador, the income effect on family labor supply caused by remittances was 
significant, dominating other effects, with the result that the reduction in labor 
supply exceeded the direct decline due to immigration. Because of economic 
dislocation resulting from civil war, these effects have eased the unemploy- 
ment problem rather than creating a labor shortage problem. 
In Puerto Rico, the flow of immigrants to the United States was so large as 
to alter significantly the island’s capital/labor ratio and thus to affect the over- 
all level of real earnings. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman estimate that a mini- 
mum of one-fourth and probably much more of the long-term upward trend in 
real earnings in Puerto Rico is due to migration to the United States. More- 
over,  since migration  was concentrated  among the  less educated and those 
lacking jobs, the migrant flow also reduced the rate of unemployment on the 
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7. By providing an important mode of  labor market adjustment, immigra- 
tion alters the set of  policy tools available to governments in source and des- 
tination countries. 
When a large number of persons migrate to another locale but leave family 
members behind, their remittances can contribute substantially to the nation’s 
supply of foreign currency. Funkhouser reports that remittances to El Salvador 
were two-thirds as great as exports and equal to the entire trade deficit, mak- 
ing immigration more important than any single industry in generating foreign 
currency.  This produced  a  major  parallel  currency  market  in  the  country, 
which limited the ability of the Salvadoran government to control the money 
supply. In Puerto Rico, migration to the United States made the imposition of 
high  minimum  wages possible because it provided  an outlet beyond unem- 
ployment for those displaced by the minimum. For the United States, immi- 
gration offers a mode of adjusting the skills of the work force to changes in 
the domestic economy, as in the  1990 effort to increase the influx of skilled 
migrants through additional visas issued on the basis of skills. However, such 
fine-tuning of the flows has traditionally been  weak owing to the focus on 
family reunification in awarding visas and the lack of success in preventing 
sizable illegal flows. 
Economic Repercussions for the United States 
8.  In the 1970s, native  migration Jrows ofset immigration to local  labor 
markets, suggesting  that the  internal migration decisions of  native workers 
may respond to the pattern of immigration among areas. 
Immigrants typically concentrate in relatively few source cities, such as Los 
Angeles, New kork, and Miami. In the previous NBER research volume, Bar- 
tel and Koch (1991) found that immigrants tended to stay in these initial areas 
rather than disperse across the country. This concentration of  immigrants in 
limited areas has led many researchers to assess the effects of immigration on 
the earnings and employment opportunities  of  native workers by examining 
differences  in native wages between cities with many immigrants and those 
with few immigrants. These studies, for the most part, find an insignificant 
correlation between the presence of immigrants in a locality and the earnings 
of natives in that locality (Grossman  1982; Borjas 1987a; Card 1990; Altonji 
and Card 1991; Butcher and Card 1991; LaLonde and Tope1 1991). 
One possible explanation of this result is that natives attenuate the negative 
effect of  immigration  by  choosing  to reside in other localities.  Using  1980 
Census data, Filer finds a negative correlation between the in-migration rates 
of  natives to particular cities and the presence of  immigrants in those cities. 
This result  suggests that natives  respond to the increase in immigrant labor 
supply by moving to other cities. In effect, the internal migration of natives 
dissipates the effect of immigration on particular labor markets and makes it 
difficult to determine the effects on immigration by spatial analyses. 
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lift had no noticeable effect on the population growth in Miami, but they are 
not consistent with studies of the relation between internal migration and im- 
migration in other time periods. Bronars (1989) found an inverse correlation 
between  immigration and native mobility among states in  1980 but  not  in 
earlier Census years.  Using  the Current Population  Surveys, Butcher  and 
Card (199  1) report a positive correlation between the in-migration rates of 
natives to particular cities and immigration flows in the 1980s. The evidence 
thus suggests that Filer’s results may reflect the particular historical circum- 
stances of  the late 1970s rather than a general structural pattern of response. 
Even if  this is the case, however, it casts doubt on inferences of the broad 
economic effects of  immigration from cross-city comparisons. If  native labor 
mobility offsets the effects of  immigration on native workers in local labor 
markets in one period, perhaps flows of capital or immigrant-induced expan- 
sion of demand for goods offsets it in other periods. 
9. Immigration of  workers with less than a high school education reduced 
the rate of  decline in the less-educated work force of  the  United States, with 
important consequences for the US.  earnings distribution. 
From  the  1970s through the  1980s, the real  earnings and employment- 
population rates of less-educated American men deteriorated at a historically 
unprecedented rate.  Earnings differentials between more- and less-educated 
workers skyrocketed, and inequality rose among workers in given skill cate- 
gories, producing a more unequal income distribution. 
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz find that the flow of less-educated immigrants 
and the indirect increment in labor supply due to the importation of  goods 
produced  by  less-educated workers contributed substantially to the rise in 
earnings differentials across education groups. Because of  the concentration 
of  immigrants among workers with less than a high school education, more 
than one-quarter of American workers with fewer than twelve years of school- 
ing in  1988 were immigrants. The massive trade deficit experienced by  the 
United States during the 1980s contributed an additional increment to the im- 
plicit labor supply of less-educated workers, with the result that in 1988 the 
combined effect of immigration and trade was to increase the “supply” of high 
school dropouts in the U.S. economy by  about 30 percent. By  contrast, the 
effect of immigration and trade on the supply of more-educated workers was 
relatively modest. 
Given reasonable responses of wages and employment opportunities to an 
increase in the ratio of less-educated to more-educated workers, this massive 
change in relative supplies must have had a sizable adverse effect on the eco- 
nomic well-being of less-skilled workers. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz find that 
perhaps as much as half the 10 percentage point decline in the relative weekly 
wage of  high school dropouts between  1980 and  1988 can be attributed to 
trade and immigration flows. 
This conclusion contrasts sharply with the inference drawn from spatially 
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the earnings and employment of natives in localities where large numbers of 
immigrants reside and of natives in localities with limited numbers of immi- 
grants. Those studies found only modest and statistically insignificant differ- 
ences in the position of natives relative to the level of immigration, leading to 
the inference that immigration does not affect native workers. 
There are several potential explanations for the differing implications of the 
results from the aggregate analysis in this volume and the cross-area analyses 
that dominate the literature. First, note that in the spatial literature many of 
the point estimates of the effect of immigration on native earnings are statisti- 
cally insignificant and thus not inconsistent with the evidence in this volume. 
Consider, for instance, the findings in Altonji and Card (1991), which is rep- 
resentative  of  the literature based  on spatial comparisons. Using the  1980 
Census, Altonji and Card find that a 10 percentage point increase in the frac- 
tion of immigrants in a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) reduces 
the log wage of white male high school dropouts in that locality by about 1.8 
percent, with a standard error of 2.1 percent (row 6 of their table 7.9). Look- 
ing at changes between the 1970 and the 1980 Censuses, they obtain a larger 
but still statistically  insignificant effect of a ten-point increase in the immi- 
grant share on earnings of 3.6 percent.  One interpretation of  the statistical 
insignificance is that the elasticity  has a very wide confidence interval: a 5 
percent  confidence  interval would range  from -  6 to +  2 percent for their 
1980 Census result  and from -  12 to  +5 percent for their cross-sectional 
change estimate. The estimated declines in real wages for dropouts in Borjas, 
Freeman, and Katz lie at the lower end of these ranges.2 
Another possible  reason  for the perceived difference in the results  is the 
continued growth of immigrant flows (relative to the native labor supply) in 
the latter part of the 1980s, which necessarily makes immigration more signif- 
icant in the 1980s than one would infer from comparisons of local labor mar- 
kets in the  1980 Census.  If  this is correct, comparisons of  natives in cities 
with more or less immigration in the 1990 Census or with increasing immigra- 
tion from 1980 to 1990 should yield higher estimates of immigrant effects than 
did estimates based largely on the 1980 Census. 
The third explanation of the difference between the spatial studies and the 
more aggregate analyses in this volume is that local labor markets adjust rap- 
idly to the increased supply of immigrants. If markets clear rapidly, the effects 
of immigration will be dispersed throughout the economy and thus cannot be 
readily discovered by spatial analyses. Suppose, for example, that immigrants 
2.  In the Borjas, Freeman, and Katz study, the immigrant share of  high school dropouts rose 
by  about 10 percentage points between  1980 and  1988, with a resultant increase in the pay of 
dropouts (relative to high school graduates) of 2.4-6.1  percent (table 7.8). A ten-point increase 
in the immigrant share of  all workers comparable to Altonji and Card’s (1991) analysis would 
raise the immigrant share of  high school dropouts by  roughly twice as much, given the larger 
proportion of dropouts among immigrants than among natives, implying greater responses, of 4- 
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and natives are substitutes in production. Then, as immigrants enter the labor 
market, native wages fall, and natives will move to cities where they face less 
competition from immigrants (or not move to cities with large immigrant pop- 
ulations, in accord with Filer’s findings). Alternatively, the fall in wages will 
induce capital flows to the immigrant-receiving areas. As a consequence, na- 
tive wages are equalized across cities, yielding no measurable correlation be- 
tween native wage rates and the presence of immigrants across labor markets. 
This hypothesis  implies  that both  the  spatial  correlations and  the  macro 
findings are “correct.” The findings differ because they address very different 
questions. The spatially based studies correctly tell us that immigrants have 
no measurable effect on particular labor markets, but they are not informative 
about the economy-wide effects of immigration. The aggregate analysis indi- 
cates that  immigration  affects economy-wide  labor supplies, with  a sizable 
effect on the aggregate economic oppoytunities of natives. 
3. Conclusion 
The 1980s witnessed a resurgence  in the importance of immigration  as a 
determinant of demographic change in the United States, a rebirth of the po- 
litical  debate  over how  many  and  which  types  of  immigrants this  country 
should admit, and a renewal of interest in the “economics of immigration.” 
It is likely that all these trends will intensify as we enter the twenty-first 
century. The 1990 Immigration Act ensures that the size of the immigrant flow 
will increase substantially during the  1990s and that legal immigration will 
reach, if not surpass, the historically high levels recorded in the early 1900s. 
This increased immigration will be taking place at a time when the growth of 
the native-born work .force has greatly slowed down, both because of the ag- 
ing of the baby boomers and because female labor force participation rates are 
reaching a plateau.  In addition, despite the enactment of IRCA, the flow of 
illegal aliens continues unabated. It is likely, therefore, that the same concerns 
that sparked the debate over immigration policy in the 1980s will resurface in 
the next few years, with renewed pressure for further changes in policy con- 
cerning both legal and illegal immigration. 
The increasing importance of foreign-born workers to the U.S. labor mar- 
ket, and the  growing awareness that these  workers  have a  substantial  eco- 
nomic effect not only in the United  States but also in source countries,  will 
surely motivate and guide an extensive research agenda designed to measure 
these effects. The papers in this volume have highlighted a number of research 
areas that deserve further analysis: the reasons for the small cross-sectional 
correlations  between  native  employment  opportunities  and the  presence of 
immigrants in labor markets compared to the larger effect inferred from the 
aggregate  change  in  labor  supplies due to immigration;  the  definition  and 
measurement  of  immigrant  assimilation.  The reintroduction  of immigration 15  Introduction and Summary 
into mainstream economic analysis on a par with trade and capital flows has 
only just begun. 
References 
Abowd, John M., and Richard B. Freeman, eds.  1991. Immigration, Trade, and the 
Labor Market. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Altonji, Joseph, and David Card. 1991. The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Mar- 
ket Outcomes of Less-skilled Natives. In Abowd and Freeman (1991). 
Bartel, Ann P., and Marianne J. Koch. 1991. Internal Migration of U.S.  Immigrants. 
In Abowd and Freeman ( 199  1  ) . 
Ben-Porath,  Yoram.  1973. Economic Analysis of Fertility in Israel: Point and Coun- 
terpoint. Journal of  Political Economy 8  1 (MarchlApril): S2024233. 
Borjas, George J. 1985. Assimilation, Changes in Cohort Quality, and the Eamings of 
Immigrants. Journal ofLabor Economics 3 (October): 463-89. 
. 1987a. Immigrants, Minorities,  and Labor Market Competition. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 40 (April): 382-92. 
. 1987(b). Self-selection and the Eamings of Immigrants. American Economic 
Review 77 (September): 531-53. 
Borjas,  George  J., Richard  B.  Freeman,  and  Kevin  Lang.  1991. Undocumented 
Mexican-born  Workers  in  the  United  States:  How  Many,  How  Permanent?  In 
Abowd and Freeman (1991). 
Bronars, Stephen G. 1989. Immigration, Internal Migration, and Economic Growth: 
1940-1980.  University of California, Santa Barbara. Mimeo. 
Butcher, Kristen F., and David Card.  1991. Immigration and Wages: Evidence from 
the 1980s. American Economic Review 81 (May): 292-96. 
Card, David.  1990. The Impact of the Marie1 Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (January): 245-58. 
Friedberg, Rachel. 1991. The Labor Market Assimilation of Immigrants in the United 
States: The Role of Age at Arrival. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mimeo. 
Grossman, Jean. 1982. The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants to Production. 
Review of  Economics and Statistics 54 (November): 596-603. 
LaLonde, Robert J., and Robert H. Topel.  1991. Labor Market Adjustments to In- 
creased Immigration. In Abowd and Freeman (1991). 
Smith, James.  1991. Hispanics and the American Dream: An  Analysis of  Hispanic 
Male Labor Market Wages, 1940-1980.  Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp. Mimeo. 
U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1990. Statistical Yearbook of  the Immi- 
gration  and  Naturalization  Service, 1989. Washington, D.C.:  U.S.  Government 
Printing Office. This Page Intentionally Left Blank